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Information Sheet
Assessing the Malpractice Insurance Environment in Virginia


Thomas P. Cox, ARM
Vice President
PhillipsCox Insurance Services

Available As an MS Word Document

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Medical malpractice insurance premiums nationally are increasing and Virginia is no exception. In some areas of the country this is having a negative impact on the delivery of health care. Some experts believe Virginia is on the edge of such a situation. Yet, there is a demonstrated need for these rate increases, as shown in a General Accounting Office study, if the insurance companies are to remain solvent. Certain steps can be taken in Virginia to decrease the impact of the current hard market. Any tort reform should be aimed at restoring insurance to its original purpose, which is to make an injured person whole again, not reward them (and the plaintiff's attorney) for being injured. It will also be beneficial to decrease the number of claims filed that are, arguably, lacking in merit.

Malpractice insurance premiums in Virginia have increased dramatically in recent years. While some carriers began increasing rates as far back as 1997, in response to loss trends, since 2000 premiums have more than doubled. Yet, rates in Virginia are extremely competitive compared to the nation.

According to an ongoing premium study by the Physicians Insurance Association of America, the highest rates in 2003 were found in Dade County, FL. Internists in Dade County paid as much as $65,697, general surgeons $226,542, and OB/GYN's $249,196. The lowest 2003 rates in the country for these three sample specialties were: Internists, $2,786 (Nebraska); general surgeons, $8,717 (Minnesota); and, OB/GYN's, $14,662 (South Dakota).

By contrast, in Virginia the lowest internal medicine rate in 2003 was $7,101, which applied to the central Virginia area. For general surgeons the best rate appeared to be $26,973, while the best OB/GYN rate was $32,493, both for central Virginia. The highest rates remained in northern Virginia, where the least expensive internist rate was $9,447, for general surgeons $34,198, and for OB/GYN's $52,400. Note that these rates are for 2003 and several companies have already taken rate increases effective 01/01/04.

A more interesting comparison may be California rates against Virginia rates, since California's MICRA legislation from 1976 was the model considered by Congress for national tort reform. Internal medicine rates ranged from $6,488 in northern California to $25,178 in Orange County and the Los Angeles area ($7,101 to $14,019 in Virginia); general surgery rates ranged from $23,348 in northern California to $58, 830 in the Los Angeles area ($26,793 to $47,830 in Virginia); and, for OB/GYN's $36,066 in northern California to $77,814 in the Los Angeles area ($32,493 to $83,971 in Virginia).

Finally, Colorado has in place a $1 million cap on all damages (compared to Virginia's $1.7 million cap) and a $250,000 cap on non-economic damages. In Colorado rates for internal medicine ranged from $11,180 to $11,819 in 2003; for general surgeons the range was $39,036 to $44,927; and, for OB/GYN's the range was $34,868 to $74,948.

Keeping in mind Mark Twain's quote concerning lies ("There are lies, damn lies, and statistics."), it appears as if Virginia's current rates for medical professional liability insurance ("MPLI"), while increasing dramatically in recent years, remain among the more moderate rates in the country. In fact, most carriers claim that rates today have simply returned to where they were in the late 1980's, at the end of the last hard market. It is also often noted that the MPLI marketplace would not be as hard today if rates had remained at those levels, which leads to a discussion of how we got here.

After the last hard market in the mid to late 1980's, rates declined slowly with the lowest rates appearing in the mid 1990's. This was due to companies having built large surpluses due to reserve redundancies, as well as usually moderate and predictable jury verdicts, competition, and a stable or growing economy. It should be noted, however, that some of the competition was in the form of growth strategies that were less than financially sound. As the 1990's began drawing to a close, however, multiple storm clouds were gathering over the property & casualty industry as a whole, of which MPLI is a part. Challenges were beginning to grow in liability lines of coverage, with the MPLI industry having specific problems.

In the late 1990's the property & casualty reinsurance industry began running loss ratios over 112%, according to A.M. Best (companies purchase insurance to protect themselves from large losses, which is called reinsurance). This increase was primarily due to large property losses from natural disasters, such as the wind storms that struck Europe in December 1999, but was also due to increasing MPLI losses. Industry journals began to warn of an impending hard market due solely to increased reinsurance costs. Coincidental with growing loss ratios in the reinsurance industry, medical malpractice jury verdicts began to increase dramatically in the late 1990's, with Jury Verdict Research showing an increase in verdicts from an average of $500,000 in 1997 to over $1 million by 2002. Increasing loss severity as the leading cause of the increase in MPLI premiums was supported by a General Accounting Office report prepared earlier this year for congress.

The increase in loss severity was, at first, difficult to get a handle on as payments in general appeared to be increasing slowly. However, the most significant increase was in the number of "breathtaking" awards, jury verdicts that seemed wildly disproportionate to reality. Therefore, while loss frequency has remained mostly static during the last 15 years, loss severity has increased in a "sneaky" way, with a dramatic impact on the bottom line of both the insurance companies and the reinsurance companies.

As an example, a Georgia jury heard evidence at trial, from both the plaintiff and the defense, which was amazingly consistent. Both sides agreed that the doctor in the case decided that a birth was not progressing and that the fetus was being placed in jeopardy, and wisely ordered an emergency Caesarian-section. The patient refused! The patient insisted that she was going to deliver the baby vaginally and continued to refuse for over 20 minutes. Finally she was persuaded to have the emergency procedure, but the 20 minute delay resulted in an infant with neurologic deficits. The jury awarded the woman $12 million.

This combination of increasing loss severity in MPLI , when combined with increasing loss ratios in the reinsurance markets, created the need for rate increases for reinsurance. Most MPLI companies purchase reinsurance at a level of $500,000, meaning the reinsurance company is responsible for any loss above $500,000. Stronger companies may retain as much as $750,000 or even $1 million of any loss, while weaker companies may only retain $250,000 (Note: Doctor's Insurance Reciprocal, a Virginia risk retention group now in receivership, retained only $10,000 of any loss). When companies purchase reinsurance they are paying to cover losses above an agreed upon limit; the higher the limits offered to insureds, the more expensive the cost of reinsurance. Therefore, it costs more money to purchase reinsurance for physicians carrying limits of $2 million than it does for physician carrying limits of $1 million. This increased cost is passed along to the insured physician.

Consequently, as the severity of malpractice awards increased it had a double impact on Virginia physicians. First, the cost of reinsurance purchased by the carriers increased, and this increase was passed along to the physicians. During the last two years as much as 18% of some rate increases in Virginia was due to the increased cost of reinsurance. The second impact, however, relates to the existence of the malpractice cap.

As indicated, the malpractice insurance companies purchase coverage for, typically, any losses above $500,000. As noted, this means that it costs the MPLI companies more money to offer higher limits. Therefore, while Virginia physicians have the benefit of the protection of the malpractice cap, they also must pay a higher premium for these higher limits. In a stable reinsurance market this might not be the issue it is today, where many reinsurance companies are still struggling to return to profitability.

Further impacting the bottom line of both insurance and reinsurance companies was the economy. On average MPLI companies only have 32% of their investment income in the stock market, according to A.M. Best. Most MPLI companies have the majority of their investments in government-backed bonds or other conservative investments. From the perspective of an insurance company in a volatile line of business such as MPLI, knowing it will get a return of 6% every year is preferable to returns of 15% for some years and an investment loss in other years.

However, as the Federal Reserve has repeatedly cut interest rates it has depressed the bond market, so that companies formerly getting a 6% return are seeing a 2% return on investment. Depending on other variables, a 1% decrease in investment income can result in as much as a 25% rate increase.

So, there were multiple factors leading to an increase in MPLI premiums (loss severity, reinsurance costs, investment income) prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The impact of those attacks on the insurance industry was reported in our e-newsletter of October 10, 2001. The impact was summarized as follows:

  •   The largest worker compensation loss in history;
  •   The most expensive aviation loss in history;
  •   The largest property loss in history;
  •   The largest business interruption loss in history;
  •   The largest life insurance catastrophe in history.

Therefore, the result of 09/11/01 was to take an insurance market that was hardening and make it much harder, much quicker, and for a longer period of time, and this is what we are dealing with today. All of the events noted above have also created an extremely hard underwriting market for two reasons. First, as MPLI companies attempt to stem losses and generate an underwriting profit they are trying to limit themselves to "good risks." Unfortunately trying to determine ahead of time whether a doctor will get sued is an extremely inexact science.

The second reason for the tighter underwriting, however, stems from the dictates of the reinsurance companies. As the increasing loss severity has reached up into the reinsurance layer, the reinsurance companies have dictated to their customers to clean up their books, get rid of doctors with claims, and to not provide new coverage for doctors with claims. Each primary MPLI company, therefore, has extremely stringent underwriting guidelines making it difficult for a doctor to find coverage if he/she has had any claims. Also, certain specialties are trending badly on a national basis, to the point that some companies will not extend coverage to a physician, even if he/she is claim free, if he/she works in one of these specialties. These "problem" specialties include radiology, emergency medicine, oncology/hematology, bariatrics, gastroenterology, pathology and neurology, among others.

All of these events taken together generated a storm of massive proportions for the property casualty industry in general, for liability insurance in particular, and for MPLI specifically. However, what makes the storm a "perfect storm" for physicians is that all of the increased costs noted above are handed down to the physician in the form of higher premiums, but the physicians cannot pass the costs along to their customers, their patients. This is due to the managed care impact so prevalent in health care today, as well as to health insurance companies tying their reimbursement to Medicare.

When Medicare became law in 1965 the average age of death in this country was 67 years of age. As most people retired at age 65 it was easy to design a health insurance program that normally lasted only two years. In addition, doctors were able to offset low Medicare (and Medicaid) reimbursement because the balance of their practice was fee-for-service (the fee the doctor billed was what the doctor was paid).

Today people are living longer and the challenges of Medicare are well documented. More importantly, as health insurance companies tie reimbursement to Medicare reimbursement, each cut in Medicare reimbursement has resulted in a similar cut by the private health insurance companies. As noted previously, most companies have related that MPLI premiums today are back up to where they were in the late 1980's; unfortunately, physician reimbursement today is estimated to be about 35% of what it was at that same time.

Potential Solutions

There are a handful of things that can be done to decrease the cost of MPLI insurance in Virginia, including tort reform. One long-term impact of tort reform may be to loosen underwriting guidelines sooner than will occur solely with a softening of the insurance market. If physicians with claims have more choices or can stay out of the surplus lines market it will benefit the health care delivery system in Virginia.

One simple step to reducing cost to physicians, although not without risk, would be to "motivate" hospitals and health insurance companies to remove their mandates that physicians carry limits equal to or greater than the malpractice cap. The hospitals and insurance companies (not the Virginia Code) mandate that physicians carry limits equal to or greater than the cap in order to limit their exposure as a "deep pocket." If physicians were allowed to carry minimum limits of $1 million/$3 million (which is what most physicians carry in states without malpractice caps), it could reduce premiums by 15% to 25%. Given the opportunity to carry limits lower than the cap, physicians could choose between the absolute protection of the cap and the tolerable uncertainty of a verdict against them in excess of their limits.

In terms of tort reform, any measure that helps return liability insurance to its original intention will work well. Specifically, the foundation of insurance is to spread risk, decreasing the chance of a large loss negatively impacting the insured. For the injured party the intention of insurance is to make the party whole again, or as close to whole as possible, not reward them for being injured. In terms of liability insurance, however, and specifically MPLI, the tort system has evolved is such a way that injured parties are made whole many times over. This is why it is often referred to as a "lottery".

For example, if someone has demonstrated actual damages of $500,000, in terms of additional medical expense, loss of opportunity, loss of future earnings and the like, fair compensation to make that person whole again would seem to be $500,000, plus reasonable fees and expenses for the attorney. Yet juries today routinely return verdicts of over $1 million for cases with less than $500,000 in damages. Anything awarded over the actual economic damages must be ascribed to "pain and suffering" or non-economic damages. It is for this reason that a cap on non-economic damages is one of the most frequently mentioned approaches to tort reform.

The plaintiff's bar is adamantly opposed to any such cap, asserting it decreases the amount of money available to the plaintiff. However, another suggested tort reform is capping the amount of money a plaintiff's attorney can recover as his/her fee. In Virginia, plaintiff's attorneys routinely keep 40% of any medical malpractice verdict or settlement as their fee. From the remaining 60% the plaintiff's attorney recovers any expenses incurred; this can routinely eat up another 10% of the award or more. Therefore, the plaintiff is commonly left with 50%, or less, of what the jury felt the plaintiff should get, in the case of a verdict, or of any settlement. If the plaintiff's bar is genuinely interested in getting more money into the pocket of the injured party, reducing or capping their fees would help tremendously.

Another avenue for tort reform in Virginia is elimination of or tightening of the non-suit rule. As presently constituted, the plaintiff can wait until just before the jury announces its verdict to take a nonsuit. In other states a nonsuit must be requested 30 days in advance or more. The sooner a nonsuit is taken, the less expense is incurred by everyone.

Additionally, in some states the plaintiff must present evidence of the potential validity of a claim before filing a suit. This is usually called an Affidavit of an Expert. In short, before filing a suit the plaintiff must show that a qualified expert has stated that there is a potentially valid claim. While there are a large number of physicians who work as "hired gun" experts, any one of which would be willing to testify to the validity of a claim, this action could discourage some suits that may be lacking in merit. As mentioned previously, the tight underwriting market makes it almost impossible for a physician to find coverage in the standard market if he/she has had any claims, with or without indemnity payments. I can site multiple examples of physicians who clearly should not have been named in claims being named regardless; this is detrimental to the physician not only in terms of finding insurance coverage, but also in terms of being credentialed by hospitals and health insurance companies.

A more creative approach, however, would be to decrease the number of suits filed by subjecting claims to a review panel. Virginia already has, within the medical malpractice tort system, provisions for a review panel. Review by this panel is not mandatory and the findings are not binding; add to this the fact that the defense usually prevails at panel and it is easy to see why the panel is not attractive to plaintiffs. However, it is for the very reason that these panels are unattractive to plaintiffs that they can be used to decrease the frequency of suits.

It can be strongly argued that physicians are not tried by a jury of their peers. The average person has little chance of understanding the practice and art of medicine, and even less of a chance of understanding all the clinical aspects of the care rendered. Studies have shown that the average juror, when faced with this situation, tends to make an emotional decision rather than one based on facts. This is one reason why an increasing number of jurors, when polled after a plaintiff's verdict, respond that they do not feel the physician did anything wrong, but someone needed to "take care of" the injured person. That this lack of fault should negate any indemnity payment appears to be beyond the ability of the courts to enforce today.

Therefore, it is my belief that a panel hearing, coupled with some penalties under certain conditions, might decrease the number of claims and provide some relief to MPLI companies trying to do business in Virginia. Decreasing the number of claims filed will help. An ongoing study by the Physicians Insurance Association of America has shown that the average cost of defending a malpractice case in which no indemnity payment is made was $7,200 in 1997 (I am trying to get updated figures). If a company has 200 claim files open at one time in Virginia, which is not uncommon, we can predict that 75% will likely close without an indemnity payment. Yet, this would mean that the company would have to earn over $1 million in premium each year, just to offset the cost of defending claims that, arguably, should not have been filed in the first place.

The current malpractice review panel in Virginia is composed of two physicians and two attorneys, the panel presided over by a retired circuit court judge. These are people who pay attention to facts, which is why the defense frequently prevails at panel hearings. Evidence is presented by one or both sides; in recent years this has been primarily the defense, as plaintiff's, tired of losing, usually do not participate. The panel can render one of four decisions: negligence by the defendants and causation; negligence and no causation; no negligence, but causation; and, no negligence and no causation. The decision of the panel is not binding, but can be introduced as evidence at trial.

What I propose is that all claims go to panel, preferably before suit is filed or else early in the litigation process. Both sides present evidence and the panel issues its ruling. The ruling is not binding, but can be used at trial. However, should the panel rule in favor of the physician AND the plaintiff chooses to continue with the claim AND the plaintiff loses at trial, the plaintiff's attorney (not the plaintiff) must pay all the defense costs. As pointed out previously, the plaintiff's attorney is the only person who, under the current tort system, has nothing to lose, financially. If there is some risk associated in proceeding with a case that a panel has already declared is lacking in merit, it may short-circuit some claims and reduce Allocated Loss Expenses.

Finally, the issue of mediation and arbitration of claims is getting some attention. First of all, anything that removes the antagonism of the legal process from a claim can be beneficial. Mediation and arbitration also present an excellent opportunity for the patient to hear first-hand information about what happened and why. Finally, if mediation and arbitration are used in an effort to get both parties talking to each other and prevent claims from being filed, these approaches should produce some benefits over the current system.

The only challenge with mediation and arbitration is that the vast majority of the time these activities are undertaken with the presumption by the plaintiff that there will be a settlement. That is, the mediation or arbitration is not considered an avenue to determine if the physician was negligent, but is only an effort to settle a case outside of a courtroom.

When viewed in total, then, it appears that mediation and arbitration may decrease awards, resulting in lower attorney's fees and less money in the pocket of the plaintiff (absent a sliding scale on attorney's fees). While this lower award may be a more just award than the current lottery approach, for this reason it is likely to be met with resistance by the plaintiff's bar. It also, truth be told, will decrease billable hours for the defense attorneys. As there is a growing shortage of capable medical malpractice defense attorneys, taking steps designed to make it harder for them to earn a living may be counterproductive in the long run
.

SUMMARY

1. Malpractice premiums in Virginia have increased, but are still moderately priced relative to most of the rest of the country.
2. There are multiple reasons for these increases, including increased loss severity, more expensive reinsurance, and reduced investment income.
3. The hard cap in Virginia remains the single greatest factor in keeping malpractice premiums under control.
4. Increased reimbursement for physicians would help offset the increased cost of malpractice insurance.
5. Steps can be taken to reduce the cost of insurance, including tort reform, although premiums are not likely to return to the low levels of the early 1990's.

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