
Information
Sheet
Assessing the Malpractice Insurance Environment in Virginia
Thomas
P. Cox, ARM
Vice President
PhillipsCox Insurance Services
Available
As an MS Word Document
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY: Medical malpractice insurance premiums nationally
are increasing and Virginia is no exception. In some areas of
the country this is having a negative impact on the delivery
of health care. Some experts believe Virginia is on the edge
of such a situation. Yet, there is a demonstrated need for these
rate increases, as shown in a General Accounting Office study,
if the insurance companies are to remain solvent. Certain steps
can be taken in Virginia to decrease the impact of the current
hard market. Any tort reform should be aimed at restoring insurance
to its original purpose, which is to make an injured person
whole again, not reward them (and the plaintiff's attorney)
for being injured. It will also be beneficial to decrease the
number of claims filed that are, arguably, lacking in merit.
Malpractice
insurance premiums in Virginia have increased dramatically in
recent years. While some carriers began increasing rates as
far back as 1997, in response to loss trends, since 2000 premiums
have more than doubled. Yet, rates in Virginia are extremely
competitive compared to the nation.
According
to an ongoing premium study by the Physicians Insurance Association
of America, the highest rates in 2003 were found in Dade County,
FL. Internists in Dade County paid as much as $65,697, general
surgeons $226,542, and OB/GYN's $249,196. The lowest 2003 rates
in the country for these three sample specialties were: Internists,
$2,786 (Nebraska); general surgeons, $8,717 (Minnesota); and,
OB/GYN's, $14,662 (South Dakota).
By
contrast, in Virginia the lowest internal medicine rate in 2003
was $7,101, which applied to the central Virginia area. For
general surgeons the best rate appeared to be $26,973, while
the best OB/GYN rate was $32,493, both for central Virginia.
The highest rates remained in northern Virginia, where the least
expensive internist rate was $9,447, for general surgeons $34,198,
and for OB/GYN's $52,400. Note that these rates are for 2003
and several companies have already taken rate increases effective
01/01/04.
A
more interesting comparison may be California rates against
Virginia rates, since California's MICRA legislation from 1976
was the model considered by Congress for national tort reform.
Internal medicine rates ranged from $6,488 in northern California
to $25,178 in Orange County and the Los Angeles area ($7,101
to $14,019 in Virginia); general surgery rates ranged from $23,348
in northern California to $58, 830 in the Los Angeles area ($26,793
to $47,830 in Virginia); and, for OB/GYN's $36,066 in northern
California to $77,814 in the Los Angeles area ($32,493 to $83,971
in Virginia).
Finally,
Colorado has in place a $1 million cap on all damages (compared
to Virginia's $1.7 million cap) and a $250,000 cap on non-economic
damages. In Colorado rates for internal medicine ranged from
$11,180 to $11,819 in 2003; for general surgeons the range was
$39,036 to $44,927; and, for OB/GYN's the range was $34,868
to $74,948.
Keeping
in mind Mark Twain's quote concerning lies ("There are
lies, damn lies, and statistics."), it appears as if Virginia's
current rates for medical professional liability insurance ("MPLI"),
while increasing dramatically in recent years, remain among
the more moderate rates in the country. In fact, most carriers
claim that rates today have simply returned to where they were
in the late 1980's, at the end of the last hard market. It is
also often noted that the MPLI marketplace would not be as hard
today if rates had remained at those levels, which leads to
a discussion of how we got here.
After
the last hard market in the mid to late 1980's, rates declined
slowly with the lowest rates appearing in the mid 1990's. This
was due to companies having built large surpluses due to reserve
redundancies, as well as usually moderate and predictable jury
verdicts, competition, and a stable or growing economy. It should
be noted, however, that some of the competition was in the form
of growth strategies that were less than financially sound.
As the 1990's began drawing to a close, however, multiple storm
clouds were gathering over the property & casualty industry
as a whole, of which MPLI is a part. Challenges were beginning
to grow in liability lines of coverage, with the MPLI industry
having specific problems.
In
the late 1990's the property & casualty reinsurance industry
began running loss ratios over 112%, according to A.M. Best
(companies purchase insurance to protect themselves from large
losses, which is called reinsurance). This increase was primarily
due to large property losses from natural disasters, such as
the wind storms that struck Europe in December 1999, but was
also due to increasing MPLI losses. Industry journals began
to warn of an impending hard market due solely to increased
reinsurance costs. Coincidental with growing loss ratios in
the reinsurance industry, medical malpractice jury verdicts
began to increase dramatically in the late 1990's, with Jury
Verdict Research showing an increase in verdicts from an average
of $500,000 in 1997 to over $1 million by 2002. Increasing loss
severity as the leading cause of the increase in MPLI premiums
was supported by a General Accounting Office report prepared
earlier this year for congress.
The
increase in loss severity was, at first, difficult to get a
handle on as payments in general appeared to be increasing slowly.
However, the most significant increase was in the number of
"breathtaking" awards, jury verdicts that seemed wildly
disproportionate to reality. Therefore, while loss frequency
has remained mostly static during the last 15 years, loss severity
has increased in a "sneaky" way, with a dramatic impact
on the bottom line of both the insurance companies and the reinsurance
companies.
As
an example, a Georgia jury heard evidence at trial, from both
the plaintiff and the defense, which was amazingly consistent.
Both sides agreed that the doctor in the case decided that a
birth was not progressing and that the fetus was being placed
in jeopardy, and wisely ordered an emergency Caesarian-section.
The patient refused! The patient insisted that she was going
to deliver the baby vaginally and continued to refuse for over
20 minutes. Finally she was persuaded to have the emergency
procedure, but the 20 minute delay resulted in an infant with
neurologic deficits. The jury awarded the woman $12 million.
This
combination of increasing loss severity in MPLI , when combined
with increasing loss ratios in the reinsurance markets, created
the need for rate increases for reinsurance. Most MPLI companies
purchase reinsurance at a level of $500,000, meaning the reinsurance
company is responsible for any loss above $500,000. Stronger
companies may retain as much as $750,000 or even $1 million
of any loss, while weaker companies may only retain $250,000
(Note: Doctor's Insurance Reciprocal, a Virginia risk retention
group now in receivership, retained only $10,000 of any loss).
When companies purchase reinsurance they are paying to cover
losses above an agreed upon limit; the higher the limits offered
to insureds, the more expensive the cost of reinsurance. Therefore,
it costs more money to purchase reinsurance for physicians carrying
limits of $2 million than it does for physician carrying limits
of $1 million. This increased cost is passed along to the insured
physician.
Consequently,
as the severity of malpractice awards increased it had a
double impact on Virginia physicians. First, the cost of
reinsurance purchased by the carriers increased, and this increase
was passed along to the physicians. During the last two years
as much as 18% of some rate increases in Virginia was due to
the increased cost of reinsurance. The second impact, however,
relates to the existence of the malpractice cap.
As
indicated, the malpractice insurance companies purchase coverage
for, typically, any losses above $500,000. As noted, this means
that it costs the MPLI companies more money to offer higher
limits. Therefore, while Virginia physicians have the benefit
of the protection of the malpractice cap, they also must pay
a higher premium for these higher limits. In a stable reinsurance
market this might not be the issue it is today, where many reinsurance
companies are still struggling to return to profitability.
Further
impacting the bottom line of both insurance and reinsurance
companies was the economy. On average MPLI companies only have
32% of their investment income in the stock market, according
to A.M. Best. Most MPLI companies have the majority of their
investments in government-backed bonds or other conservative
investments. From the perspective of an insurance company in
a volatile line of business such as MPLI, knowing it will get
a return of 6% every year is preferable to returns of 15% for
some years and an investment loss in other years.
However,
as the Federal Reserve has repeatedly cut interest rates it
has depressed the bond market, so that companies formerly getting
a 6% return are seeing a 2% return on investment. Depending
on other variables, a 1% decrease in investment income can result
in as much as a 25% rate increase.
So,
there were multiple factors leading to an increase in MPLI premiums
(loss severity, reinsurance costs, investment income) prior
to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The impact of
those attacks on the insurance industry was reported in our
e-newsletter of October 10, 2001. The impact was summarized
as follows:
- The largest worker compensation loss in history;
- The most expensive aviation loss in history;
- The largest property loss in history;
- The largest business interruption loss in history;
- The largest life insurance catastrophe in history.
Therefore,
the result of 09/11/01 was to take an insurance market that
was hardening and make it much harder, much quicker, and for
a longer period of time, and this is what we are dealing with
today. All of the events noted above have also created an extremely
hard underwriting market for two reasons. First, as MPLI companies
attempt to stem losses and generate an underwriting profit they
are trying to limit themselves to "good risks." Unfortunately
trying to determine ahead of time whether a doctor will get
sued is an extremely inexact science.
The second
reason for the tighter underwriting, however, stems from the
dictates of the reinsurance companies. As the increasing loss
severity has reached up into the reinsurance layer, the reinsurance
companies have dictated to their customers to clean up their
books, get rid of doctors with claims, and to not provide new
coverage for doctors with claims. Each primary MPLI company,
therefore, has extremely stringent underwriting guidelines making
it difficult for a doctor to find coverage if he/she has had
any claims. Also, certain specialties are trending badly on
a national basis, to the point that some companies will not
extend coverage to a physician, even if he/she is claim free,
if he/she works in one of these specialties. These "problem"
specialties include radiology, emergency medicine, oncology/hematology,
bariatrics, gastroenterology, pathology and neurology, among
others.
All of these
events taken together generated a storm of massive proportions
for the property casualty industry in general, for liability
insurance in particular, and for MPLI specifically. However,
what makes the storm a "perfect storm" for physicians
is that all of the increased costs noted above are handed down
to the physician in the form of higher premiums, but the physicians
cannot pass the costs along to their customers, their patients.
This is due to the managed care impact so prevalent in health
care today, as well as to health insurance companies tying their
reimbursement to Medicare.
When Medicare
became law in 1965 the average age of death in this country
was 67 years of age. As most people retired at age 65 it was
easy to design a health insurance program that normally lasted
only two years. In addition, doctors were able to offset low
Medicare (and Medicaid) reimbursement because the balance of
their practice was fee-for-service (the fee the doctor billed
was what the doctor was paid).
Today people
are living longer and the challenges of Medicare are well documented.
More importantly, as health insurance companies tie reimbursement
to Medicare reimbursement, each cut in Medicare reimbursement
has resulted in a similar cut by the private health insurance
companies. As noted previously, most companies have related
that MPLI premiums today are back up to where they were in the
late 1980's; unfortunately, physician reimbursement today is
estimated to be about 35% of what it was at that same time.
Potential
Solutions
There are a handful of things that can be done to decrease the
cost of MPLI insurance in Virginia, including tort reform. One
long-term impact of tort reform may be to loosen underwriting
guidelines sooner than will occur solely with a softening of the
insurance market. If physicians with claims have more choices
or can stay out of the surplus lines market it will benefit the
health care delivery system in Virginia.
One
simple step to reducing cost to physicians, although not without
risk, would be to "motivate" hospitals and health insurance
companies to remove their mandates that physicians carry limits
equal to or greater than the malpractice cap. The hospitals and
insurance companies (not the Virginia Code) mandate that physicians
carry limits equal to or greater than the cap in order to limit
their exposure as a "deep pocket." If physicians were
allowed to carry minimum limits of $1 million/$3 million (which
is what most physicians carry in states without malpractice caps),
it could reduce premiums by 15% to 25%. Given the opportunity
to carry limits lower than the cap, physicians could choose between
the absolute protection of the cap and the tolerable uncertainty
of a verdict against them in excess of their limits.
In
terms of tort reform, any measure that helps return liability
insurance to its original intention will work well. Specifically,
the foundation of insurance is to spread risk, decreasing the
chance of a large loss negatively impacting the insured. For the
injured party the intention of insurance is to make the party
whole again, or as close to whole as possible, not reward them
for being injured. In terms of liability insurance, however, and
specifically MPLI, the tort system has evolved is such a way that
injured parties are made whole many times over. This is why it
is often referred to as a "lottery".
For
example, if someone has demonstrated actual damages of $500,000,
in terms of additional medical expense, loss of opportunity, loss
of future earnings and the like, fair compensation to make that
person whole again would seem to be $500,000, plus reasonable
fees and expenses for the attorney. Yet juries today routinely
return verdicts of over $1 million for cases with less than $500,000
in damages. Anything awarded over the actual economic damages
must be ascribed to "pain and suffering" or non-economic
damages. It is for this reason that a cap on non-economic damages
is one of the most frequently mentioned approaches to tort reform.
The
plaintiff's bar is adamantly opposed to any such cap, asserting
it decreases the amount of money available to the plaintiff. However,
another suggested tort reform is capping the amount of money a
plaintiff's attorney can recover as his/her fee. In Virginia,
plaintiff's attorneys routinely keep 40% of any medical malpractice
verdict or settlement as their fee. From the remaining 60% the
plaintiff's attorney recovers any expenses incurred; this can
routinely eat up another 10% of the award or more. Therefore,
the plaintiff is commonly left with 50%, or less, of what the
jury felt the plaintiff should get, in the case of a verdict,
or of any settlement. If the plaintiff's bar is genuinely interested
in getting more money into the pocket of the injured party, reducing
or capping their fees would help tremendously.
Another
avenue for tort reform in Virginia is elimination of or tightening
of the non-suit rule. As presently constituted, the plaintiff
can wait until just before the jury announces its verdict to take
a nonsuit. In other states a nonsuit must be requested 30 days
in advance or more. The sooner a nonsuit is taken, the less expense
is incurred by everyone.
Additionally,
in some states the plaintiff must present evidence of the potential
validity of a claim before filing a suit. This is usually called
an Affidavit of an Expert. In short, before filing a suit the
plaintiff must show that a qualified expert has stated that there
is a potentially valid claim. While there are a large number of
physicians who work as "hired gun" experts, any one
of which would be willing to testify to the validity of a claim,
this action could discourage some suits that may be lacking in
merit. As mentioned previously, the tight underwriting market
makes it almost impossible for a physician to find coverage in
the standard market if he/she has had any claims, with or without
indemnity payments. I can site multiple examples of physicians
who clearly should not have been named in claims being named regardless;
this is detrimental to the physician not only in terms of finding
insurance coverage, but also in terms of being credentialed by
hospitals and health insurance companies.
A
more creative approach, however, would be to decrease the number
of suits filed by subjecting claims to a review panel. Virginia
already has, within the medical malpractice tort system, provisions
for a review panel. Review by this panel is not mandatory and
the findings are not binding; add to this the fact that the defense
usually prevails at panel and it is easy to see why the panel
is not attractive to plaintiffs. However, it is for the very reason
that these panels are unattractive to plaintiffs that they can
be used to decrease the frequency of suits.
It
can be strongly argued that physicians are not tried by a jury
of their peers. The average person has little chance of understanding
the practice and art of medicine, and even less of a chance of
understanding all the clinical aspects of the care rendered. Studies
have shown that the average juror, when faced with this situation,
tends to make an emotional decision rather than one based on facts.
This is one reason why an increasing number of jurors, when polled
after a plaintiff's verdict, respond that they do not feel the
physician did anything wrong, but someone needed to "take
care of" the injured person. That this lack of fault should
negate any indemnity payment appears to be beyond the ability
of the courts to enforce today.
Therefore,
it is my belief that a panel hearing, coupled with some penalties
under certain conditions, might decrease the number of claims
and provide some relief to MPLI companies trying to do business
in Virginia. Decreasing the number of claims filed will help.
An ongoing study by the Physicians Insurance Association of America
has shown that the average cost of defending a malpractice case
in which no indemnity payment is made was $7,200 in 1997 (I am
trying to get updated figures). If a company has 200 claim files
open at one time in Virginia, which is not uncommon, we can predict
that 75% will likely close without an indemnity payment. Yet,
this would mean that the company would have to earn over $1 million
in premium each year, just to offset the cost of defending claims
that, arguably, should not have been filed in the first place.
The
current malpractice review panel in Virginia is composed of two
physicians and two attorneys, the panel presided over by a retired
circuit court judge. These are people who pay attention to facts,
which is why the defense frequently prevails at panel hearings.
Evidence is presented by one or both sides; in recent years this
has been primarily the defense, as plaintiff's, tired of losing,
usually do not participate. The panel can render one of four decisions:
negligence by the defendants and causation; negligence and no
causation; no negligence, but causation; and, no negligence and
no causation. The decision of the panel is not binding, but can
be introduced as evidence at trial.
What
I propose is that all claims go to panel, preferably before suit
is filed or else early in the litigation process. Both sides present
evidence and the panel issues its ruling. The ruling is not binding,
but can be used at trial. However, should the panel rule in
favor of the physician AND the plaintiff chooses to continue with
the claim AND the plaintiff loses at trial, the plaintiff's attorney
(not the plaintiff) must pay all the defense costs. As pointed
out previously, the plaintiff's attorney is the only person who,
under the current tort system, has nothing to lose, financially.
If there is some risk associated in proceeding with a case that
a panel has already declared is lacking in merit, it may short-circuit
some claims and reduce Allocated Loss Expenses.
Finally,
the issue of mediation and arbitration of claims is getting some
attention. First of all, anything that removes the antagonism
of the legal process from a claim can be beneficial. Mediation
and arbitration also present an excellent opportunity for the
patient to hear first-hand information about what happened and
why. Finally, if mediation and arbitration are used in an effort
to get both parties talking to each other and prevent claims from
being filed, these approaches should produce some benefits over
the current system.
The
only challenge with mediation and arbitration is that the vast
majority of the time these activities are undertaken with the
presumption by the plaintiff that there will be a settlement.
That is, the mediation or arbitration is not considered an avenue
to determine if the physician was negligent, but is only an effort
to settle a case outside of a courtroom.
When
viewed in total, then, it appears that mediation and arbitration
may decrease awards, resulting in lower attorney's fees and less
money in the pocket of the plaintiff (absent a sliding scale on
attorney's fees). While this lower award may be a more just award
than the current lottery approach, for this reason it is likely
to be met with resistance by the plaintiff's bar. It also, truth
be told, will decrease billable hours for the defense attorneys.
As there is a growing shortage of capable medical malpractice
defense attorneys, taking steps designed to make it harder for
them to earn a living may be counterproductive in the long run
.
SUMMARY
1. Malpractice
premiums in Virginia have increased, but are still moderately
priced relative to most of the rest of the country.
2. There are multiple reasons for these increases, including
increased loss severity, more expensive reinsurance, and reduced
investment income.
3. The hard cap in Virginia remains the single greatest factor
in keeping malpractice premiums under control.
4. Increased reimbursement for physicians would help offset
the increased cost of malpractice insurance.
5. Steps can be taken to reduce the cost of insurance, including
tort reform, although premiums are not likely to return to the
low levels of the early 1990's.
|